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This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the relationship be-
tween public sector motivation and development. The main implica-
tion derived from the model is that, somewhat paradoxically, it is not
necessarily a good thing to have cheap labor to hire in the bureaucracy.
Cheap labor makes it more di¢ cult to screen honest individuals. More-
over, motivated agents are not su¢ cient to prevent corruption. The
literature recognizes that a good public service can be obtained only
with su¢ cient pecuniary incentives or personnel motivation. While
empirical evidence exists casting some doubt on the ￿rst view, this
paper shows that the latter one may not be su¢ cient.
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11 Introduction
Understanding the role played by the state in fostering economic growth and
development is a crucial question for economists (see e.g. Amsden (1989),
Wade (1990) and Evans (1998)). Much attention has been paid to the study
of the determinants of corruption (Treisman (2000)), its e⁄ects on economic
performance (Mauro (1995)) and the organizational features associated with
a high quality public service (Evans and Rauch (1999, 2000). The World
Development Report (WorldBank (1997)), for instance, paid attention prin-
cipally to the provision of incentives on the job (according to standard e¢ -
ciency wage arguments) and to the selection of talented people (motivated
agents would automatically be attracted by meritocratic recruitment). On
the other hand, empirical evidence shows that the wage premium in the
public sector is not a good predictor of the level of corruption, that there is
huge cross country dispersion in public sector wage premia, and that cultural
and historical variables seem to play an important role. Lastly, no precise
channel has been identi￿ed to explain how the level of development a⁄ects
the level of corruption and public sector quality1.
This paper, emphasizing a joint analysis of public sector bureaucracies
1Leaving aside the standard argument that richer countries can a⁄ord higher wages
discouraging corruption for public servants, which is not however supported by strong
empirical evidence.
2and economic performance, takes a di⁄erent perspective. While public ser-
vice motivation (PSM) frequently appears in sociological and administrative
studies of public bureaucracies, it has been highly disregarded by econo-
mists2. In this non economic literature, di⁄erences in (incentives based)
payment between public and private sector managers are thought to be
compensated by a non-pecuniary bene￿t for the public employees. Along
these lines, in Wilson (1989) public sector agencies are built around the idea
of ￿ mission￿ . The mission of a public sector agency is identi￿ed with the
culture embedded in the preferences of its boss. This process of identi￿ca-
tion with the mission often motivates agents to perform their tasks more
e⁄ectively than monetary incentives. The comparative study on IT-sector
policies in three developing countries in Evans (1998) provides a good ex-
ample of how PSM agents can positively impact the functioning of state
bureaucracy. Writing about the Department of Electronics in India, Evans
reports that this agency ￿ had always been dominated by technically oriented
managers with a strong substantive interest in the sector for which they
were responsible... DOE technocrats were immersed in a project of trans-
formation that was of greater interest than minor individual perquisites￿ .
2Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) quoted in Francois (2000), de￿ne it as a ￿ general, al-
truistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation, or
humankind...￿ .
3He reports similar experiences for the Commission for the Coordination of
Electronic Processing Activities (CAPRE) in Brazil, and for the equivalent
agency in Korea. Wade (1989) reports similar evidence for top economic
bureaucracies in Taiwan. Among economists, Francois (2000) emphasizes
that the public sector can indeed be more e⁄ective in exploiting the public
service motivation of employees and can therefore be more e¢ cient in the
provision of public good. Besley and Ghatak (2003) present a model em-
phasizing the role of matching between principals and agents with similar
preferred missions as an important source of e¢ ciency in mission oriented
organizations. Hart and Holmstrom (2003) present a model of ￿rm scope in
which the preferences of thhe boss may be speci￿c to a particular activity.
By choosing the appropriate manager, shareholders can commit to ￿rm ac-
tivities that increase the motivation and welfare of workers and reduce the
wage bill for the ￿rm.
I will follow this emerging literature by modelling PSM as an exogenous
non monetary payo⁄that employees receive by working in the public sector.
The mechanism of the model being general, it is presented in the context of
a text-book model of moral hazard based on heterogeneity. The main model
is then an application of this mechanism to the analysis of the relationship
between public service motivation and development. In what follows I will
4often refer to corruption, but it should be kept in mind that the model can be
reinterpreted in terms of shirking in the public sector. The interpretation
in terms of corruption is somewhat closer to the cross country empirical
literature.
The basic intuition goes as follows: suppose a bureaucracy is composed
only by highly motivated agents and is such that wages in the bureaucracy
are (below those prevailing in the private sector, but still) high enough to
deter corruption. This will generate relatively e¢ cient state intervention and
high returns in the private sector. It will thus be easier to attract only non
motivated applicants in the bureaucracy, justifying the initial assumption
that the bureaucracy is of high quality. It is easy to construct the opposite
vicious circle leading to low wages in the private sector and poor bureaucratic
performance. This intuition thus suggests that multiple equilibria can exist
for a given level of compensation in the public sector.
The model also predicts that the relationship between public sector
wages and corruption may be non-monotonic. This result follows from
the interplay of moral hazard and selection constraints, the latter working
through the endogenously determined outside option for the public sector,
i.e. the equilibrium wage in the private sector.
Because the main mechanism works through a self selection constraint,
5the multiple equilibria of the model are Pareto Ranked. The results can thus
be reinterpreted as arising from a pure coordination failure. If non motivated
agents believe that other non motivated agents will join the public sector in
order to extract rents, they will ￿nd optimal to join the public sector too.
This is so because the low quality of the public good worsens their position
in the labor market. When rents that can be extracted from corruption are
endogeneized, the Pareto ranking result is easily lost.
The main implication derived from the model is that, somewhat para-
doxically, it is not necessarily a good thing to have cheap labor to hire in the
public sector. Cheap labor, makes it more di¢ cult to screen honest (pub-
licly motivated) individuals. Moreover, motivated agents are not su¢ cient
to prevent corruption. The literature recognizes that a good public service
can be obtained only with su¢ cient pecuniary incentives or personnel mo-
tivation. While empirical evidence exists casting some doubts on the ￿rst
view, this paper shows that the latter one may not be su¢ cient. In order
to isolate in the most transparent way the economic mechanism behind the
results, the analysis will treat variables that are likely determined by some
form of political process as exogenous. Their endogeneization is discussed
after the main results have been presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
6general argument with a simple model based on moral hazard, heterogene-
ity and complementarities. Section 3 considers an application of the general
mechanism to the relationship between public sector motivation and devel-
opment. The main results are presented, along with some extensions. Section
4 presents empirical evidence consistent with the main results, and further
discusses some of the assumptions and policy implications. Section 5 o⁄ers
some concluding remarks. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 General Argument
Assume two sectors, i 2 f1;2g: There are two types of agents, t 2 f￿;0g in
proportion ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ respectively. Both types, t = 0 and t = ￿ > 0 can
undertake two levels of e⁄ort, ei;L at zero utility cost and ei;H with associated
disutility cost of ei ￿ ￿(i) ￿ t; where ￿(i) is an indicator variable that takes
value 1 in sector 1 and zero otherwise3. Denote y2(e1) the successful outcome
in sector 2, which is increasing in e1, the average level of e⁄ort taken in sector
1. Assume however that y1(e2) = y does not depend on e2; the average level
of e⁄ort in sector two. When a project fails it yields a payo⁄ of zero in both
sectors.
3This is equivalent to saying that high e⁄ort is less costly in sector 1 for ￿￿type agents.
All the other e⁄ort levels have the same cost for the two types of agents.
7In each sector there is free entry of principals with reservation utility
equal to ￿i ￿ 0. Conditional on high e⁄ort, a project is a success with
probability pi = pi > 1
2 If a worker chooses to exert no e⁄ort, at a cost
ei;L = 0 the probability of a success is p
i = 1
2 < pi = pi: I will denote
￿pi = pi ￿ 1
2: Workers are risk neutral and subject to a limited liability
constraint: in each state of the world their compensation wi;k; for k 2 fl;hg




pi + ei;H the contracts in sector i will implement the
high level of e⁄ort.





￿ e1 ￿ ￿ it is thus the case that in sector
1 ￿ ￿ type agents will exert high e⁄ort while 0 ￿ type agents will not. The
two types will take di⁄erent actions in sector 1. Denote U2(e1) the level of
utility that agents receive in sector 2. We thus have that either U2(e1) =
p2y2(e1) ￿ e2 ￿ ￿2 if ￿p2y2(e1) ￿ e2 +
￿p2￿2
p2 or U2(e1) = 1
2y2(e1) ￿ ￿2
otherwise. U2(e1) is increasing in y2(e1); and thus in e1 itself, and does not
depend on agent￿ s type.
Assuming for simplicity ￿2 = 0; and p2(y2(1
2) ￿ e2
￿p2) > 0; we can state
the following
8Proposition 1





￿ e1￿￿; and p1y1￿e1￿￿1+￿ > p2y2(p1)￿
e2 > 1
2y1 ￿ ￿1 > p2y2(1
2 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿p1) ￿ e2, there are 3 equilibria, in which
0 ￿ type agents choose to work in sector 1 with probabilities equal to zero,
one or e ￿ 2 (0;1): This last equilibrium is however unstable.
The intuition for the proposition goes as follows. Suppose only type
t = ￿ works in sector one. Then e⁄ort will be high, and the utility of
working in sector 2 will also be high: while ￿ ￿ type workers prefer sector
1 (￿rst inequality), types t = 0 will work in sector 2 (second inequality),
and complete separation occurs. Conversely, suppose that types t = 0 work
in sector 1. Then e⁄ort in sector 1 will be relatively low (on average equal
to e p = p1￿ + 1
2(1 ￿ ￿)), and the utility from working in sector 2 will be
lower (third inequality). This will in turn con￿rm that it is optimal for
0 ￿ type workers to choose sector 1, and a pooling equilibrium occurs4. In
other terms, there is a strategic complementarity in the occupational choice
decision. In this sense heterogeneity is crucial to obtain multiple equilibria.
Moreover, from the inspection of the condition above, we can also state
the following
4When there is semi-pooling of types, the mixing in sector 1 is such that the utility of
0￿types is the same in both sectors, so that they are indi⁄erent and randomize with the
￿ right￿probabilities across the two occupations.
9Corollary
The two equilibria are Pareto Ranked.
The two equilibria are Pareto ranked because the mechanism works
through a selection constraint. In particular it has to be the case that
0 ￿ type workers are better o⁄ in sector 2 when e1 = eH than in sector 1
exerting no e⁄ort. This is the separating condition which de￿nes the equi-
librium itself.
Two remarks are important. From what is reported above it should be
clear that not even the moral hazard component is necessary for the result:
what is necessary is that heterogeneity changes the behavior in the sector
exerting externalities on the other one. So far I have looked at heterogeneity
on the cost of e⁄ort. It is possible to get similar results allowing heterogene-
ity in the productivity of e⁄ort (e.g. p￿ > p0) or on the (marginal) utility of
money, or considering a continuous distribution of agent types5. Although
the argument is presented through a simple example, the reasoning is thus
general and robust to di⁄erent types of heterogeneity.
5The mechanism is similar to the one in Ghatak et al. (2003) in the context of the
interaction between labor and credit markets.
103 The model
3.1 Set Up
Consider an economy composed of a private and a public sector. Variables
related to the latter will have a b￿subscript; while the former a p￿subscript:
Returns in the private sector are positively a⁄ected by the quality of a public
good provided by the public sector bureaucracy. Infrastructures and law
enforcement are common examples of this sort of public good. In general,
one may think of these public goods as the quality of Governance of the
country.
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of individuals
that live only one period. The public sector is of size b; which is assumed to
be exogenously given and determined by an unspeci￿ed political economy
process. Individuals are heterogeneous in terms of a characteristic referred
to as public service motivation. The way public service motivation a⁄ects
utility and (equilibrium) behavior of agents will be speci￿ed later. The
proportion of motivated agents in the economy is ￿ > b6.
6It will become clear that if ￿ < b there are not enough motivated agents to ￿ll the
public sector. It would not be possible to solve the selection problem in the public sector,
and an underdevelopment trap would be automatically obtained.
113.2 Agency problem in the public and private sector
Each public sector employee controls an exogenously given amount of re-
sources g that she can partially divert to increase her payo⁄ by an amount
equal to ￿g; with ￿ ￿ 1: If she is caught (which occurs with exogenously
given probability q), she loses her job, and wage. This is assumed to be the
maximum penalty available to deter public sector employees against corrup-
tion. A motivated agent simply receives an extra non monetary payo⁄ ￿ by
working in the public sector; this extra non monetary payo⁄ thus has the
e⁄ect of favoring deterrence of corruption7. Even motivated agents will yield
to temptation, if temptation is strong enough. Denoting wb the (exogenously
given) wage paid in the public sector, we can de￿ne the value of a public
sector career as V b(wb;￿) = maxfwb+￿(￿);
￿
wb + ￿(￿) + ￿g
￿
￿(1 ￿ q)g; where
￿(￿) takes value ￿ for motivated agents and zero otherwise. To prevent an
agent from being corrupt the wage in the bureaucracy must satisfy
wb ￿ ￿￿g ￿ ￿(￿)
7In Francois (2000) the non pecuniary bene￿ts are an increasing function of the pro-
vided level of public service. All the results would be preserved if the private bene￿ts were
endogenous and increasing in the level of public good provision. Any mechanism that
implies a higher level of motivation in a good equilibrium would be an additional source
for multiple equilibira. By omitting these forces, the model more transparently underlines
a di⁄erent source for multiple equilibria.
12with ￿ =
1￿q
q . The rents that one can extract through corruption are given
by e g = g(1 ￿ q). These rents can be endogeneized through internal or
external mechanisms without a⁄ecting the main results. For instance, the
probability of being caught taking bribes could depend on the motivation of
supervisors, or the amount of money that one can divert could depend on
the level of economic development of the country.
It should be clear from the model sketched above that the wage paid
in the public sector could be made endogenous by solving the agency prob-
lem in the government for a given distribution of bargaining power between
di⁄erent levels of the public sector hierarchy. Depending on the resources
available to the government, the valuation of the project by the govern-
ment, and the amount of rents that superior liars in the government would
retain, equilibrium payo⁄s from honesty and corruption would be obtained.
The only important requirement for the results to hold is that, for some
range of the above parameters (rents, etc... ) the equilibrium behavior and
payo⁄s in the public sector of motivated and non motivated agents would
be di⁄erent. This reduced form speci￿cation delivers the main intuition in a
more transparent way, remaining silent about the political economy mech-
anism beyond the determination of public sector wages and rent sharing,
whose analysis deserves separate treatment.
13Depending on the utility Up(G) that workers get in the private sector,
a pooling (V b(wb;0) > Up(G)) or a separating (V b(wb;0) ￿ Up(G)) equilib-
rium will arise. Let the public good provided G(x) be an increasing func-
tion of x; the proportion of successful projects realized in the public sector.
Depending on the selection of types and their compensation in the public
sector, the proportion of corrupt agents will be equal to either zero, 1￿￿ or
one. The bureaucracy could be composed of only honest agents producing
a public good G(pp) = Gh: We could then have a bureaucracy with honest
motivated and corrupt non motivated agents, respectively in proportion ￿
and 1￿￿; producing a public good G(e p = ￿pp+ 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)) = Gm, and lastly
a public sector in which everybody is corrupt, producing a public good equal
to G(1
2) = Gl: Clearly Gh > Gm > Gl:
I now turn to the private sector. Firms in the private sector hire n
workers each running a project whose payo⁄s are independently distributed.
The structure of the agency problem is identical to that speci￿ed in the
section above. In particular a worker in the private sector earns a utility
equal to Up(G) = max
￿
ppyp(G) ￿ ep ￿ ￿p; 1
2yp(G) ￿ ￿p
￿
: The utility in the
private sector is thus increasing in G and decreasing in ￿p; which is a measure
of bargaining power for entrepreneurs. Given that pp > 1
2; we have that e⁄ort
will be exerted in the private sector only if yp(G) is su¢ ciently high. The
14bargaining power of ￿rms, as summarized by ￿p; a⁄ects the e⁄ort decision
and, most importantly, the selection of agents across the two sectors: raising
￿p makes the public sector relatively more attractive.
3.3 Results
The model above, in having a ￿xed amount of places in the public sector
equal to b; necessarily entails some rationing. Hence the equilibrium payo⁄s
of workers in the two sectors will generally not be equalized. While the case
in which everybody prefers to work in the public sector does not represent
a problem because of the rationing, it is in principle possible that nobody
wants to work in the public sector. This case is ruled out by
Assumption 1




Part i) says that even when the public sector is of very high quality, the
payo⁄s in the private sector are such that motivated workers would prefer
to go in the public sector. Without this assumption it could happen that
nobody wants to work in the public sector. Either the wage in the public
sector should be raised, or an alternative mechanism should be speci￿ed
15to ensure a well de￿ned equilibrium. We omit this case from the analysis
without a⁄ecting the main results and in order to present the main intuition
and results in the neatest possible way. Part ii) rules out the case in which
workers do not exert e⁄ort in the private sector when the public sector is
su¢ ciently ine¢ cient, and further simpli￿es the analysis.
The following proposition completely characterizes the set of equilibria.
Proposition 2






G = Gm is an equilibrium if V (￿￿g;0) ￿ maxfUp(Gm);wbg and wb 2
￿
maxf￿￿g ￿ ￿;V ￿1(Up(Gm);0)g;￿￿g
￿
G = Gh is an equilibrium if wb 2 [￿￿g;1) or if V (￿￿g;0) < Up(Gh)
and wb 2
￿
￿￿g ￿ ￿;minfV ￿1(Up(Gh);0);￿￿gg
￿
8:
To prove the proposition we ￿rst note that, for a given wage in the pub-
lic sector, the payo⁄ of a motivated agent is always higher than the payo⁄
for a non motivated agent. Moreover, if a motivated agent is corrupt, a
non motivated agent will be corrupt, while the contrary is not necessarily
true. Gl can thus be obtained only if motivated agents are corrupt. Gm can
8The last case is necessarly a pooling equilibrium.
16be obtained only with a pooling equilibrium in which only non motivated
agents would be corrupt, while Gh can be obtained with either a pooling or
a separating equilibrium in which nobody is corrupt. The equilibrium cor-
respondence is depicted in ￿gure 1. On the x￿axis there is the wage in the
public sector wb; which is an exogenously given parameter. On the y￿axis
are reported the utility levels for workers in the public and private sector.
In the private sector, depending on the e¢ ciency of the public bureaucracy,
these utilities are equal to Up(Gi) = Ui; for i 2 fH;M;Lg: The thick lines
show the equilibrium correspondence. When wb < ￿￿g￿￿; every public sec-
tor employee will be corrupt. This implies that the only possible realization
of private sector utility is UL; which is consistent with either a pooling or
a separating equilibrium. When wb 2 [￿￿g ￿ ￿;￿￿g]; motivated agents will
be honest but non motivated agents will be corrupt. While UM is consistent
only with a pooling equilibrium in this interval, UH will be consistent with
a separating equilibrium in this interval. Lastly, if wb ￿ ￿￿g; nobody will
be corrupt, and the utility of workers in the private sector will be UH: This
￿gure immediately gives us
Proposition 3
When wb 2 [￿￿g￿￿;￿￿g] multiple equilibria occur if Up(Gm) ￿ V (￿￿g;0)












The same wage in the public sector, can be su¢ cient to deter corrup-
tion of motivated agents, but may not be enough to deter corruption of
non motivated ones. When this is the case, the equilibrium level of G is an
increasing function of the utility that agents receive on the labor market.
When the utility of working in the private sector is high enough, non mo-
tivated agents will not take a job in the public sector. On the other hand
the equilibrium utility that workers receive on the private labor market is
a weakly increasing function of G: The combination of these two increasing
equilibrium relationships naturally leads to multiple equilibria. Therefore,
a given level of the wage paid in the bureaucracy can be consistent with
either a high, or a low wage in the private sector. Remember that the pro-
portion of motivated agents ￿ is bigger than the size of the bureaucracy b.
The model says that it is not enough to have motivated agents in order to
avoid corruption. Moreover it is not necessarily good to have cheap labor to
hire in the public sector: cheap labor makes it more di¢ cult to screen out
non motivated and corrupt agents.
As noted in the previous section, when multiple equilibria exist they
must be Pareto ranked. It is thus possible to reinterpret the multiplicity of
equilibria as a form of coordination failure. Suppose that a non motivated
18agent thinks that other non motivated agents will go in the public sector
looking for rents to extract through corruption. Given these beliefs, she will
￿nd it optimal to go in the public sector correctly anticipating that the wage
in the private sector will be quite low. This reasoning is appealing because
it relates the issue of corruption to the cultural situation of a given country,
consistent with empirical evidence further discussed below.
To see why the two equilibria are necessarily Pareto Ranked, note that in
a Gh equilibrium workers in the private sector (motivated or not) are better
o⁄ and motivated public servants are indi⁄erent with respect to a Gm equi-
librium. The only issue is thus to compare the situation of corrupt public
servants in the Gm equilibrium with workers in the private sector in the Gh
one. By construction, in a Gh equilibrium we have that Up(Gh) > V (wb;0);
while in a Gm equilibrium V (wb;0) > Up(Gm): The Pareto ranking thus
comes from the de￿nition of a good and a bad equilibrium in terms of sepa-
ration versus pooling, and from the fact that the rents of being corrupt are
identical in the two equilibria (V (wb;0) is constant across the two equilib-
ria). The fact that the two equilibria are Pareto Ranked however implies
that there are strong reasons for any political process to choose the high
wage equilibrium.
Although very stylized, the public sector in this model combines two
19incentive problems: on the one hand paying a lower wage is used to attract
only motivated agents (selection); on the other hand it is possible that some
rents have to be paid in order to deter corruption and ex-post opportunis-
tic behavior (moral hazard). The equilibrium interaction of the incentive
compatibility and selection constraints, gives us the following
Proposition 4
When multiple equilibria exist, the level of corruption is not monotonic
in the wage paid in the public sector, wb; if Up(Gh) ￿ ￿￿g:
The intuition for this result is as follow. Suppose the economy starts
with a relatively low (but still higher than ￿￿g ￿ ￿) wage paid in the pub-
lic sector. This wage is su¢ ciently high to deter corruption for motivated
agents, and it is so low that it will not attract non motivated ones. The
country will be characterized by a low level of corruption, despite the low
wage in the public sector. Assume now that the wage in the bureaucracy
rises for exogenous reasons. These additional rents will start attracting non
motivated agents, but may well not be enough to deter their corruption.
The level of corruption will jump to 1￿￿; the proportion of non motivated
agents in the bureaucracy. Clearly further increases in the wage paid in the
public sector will not change the selection of agents in the bureaucracy, but
20may lower the level of corruption, following the standard e¢ ciency wage
argument. In other terms, the endogenously determined outside option of
the agents (the utility workers get in the private labor market) determines
which constraints are binding when we change wb.
3.4 Occupational choice and wealth inequalities
The model can be extended to consider a process of occupational choice
to explore the e⁄ects of wealth inequalities. Assume wealth is distributed
according to a continuous and strictly increasing cumulative function F(a),
a 2 [0;1): Each agent decides her occupation at the beginning of the period.
She could become an entrepreneur, a bureaucrat or a worker in the private
sector. A subsistence technology absorbs the excess labor supply. This
technology is available to everybody and yields an individual return equal to
w. The set of occupations in the economy is therefore given by o 2 fs;w;b;eg
(subsistence, workers, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs).
To become an entrepreneur an agent has to invest k units of capital
employing n workers each running a di⁄erent project. A successful project
generates a return equal to R + G; where G is as de￿ned above. Credit
markets are competitive, but not perfect. A borrower taking a loan of size
B will repay if and only if Br ￿ ￿￿ where r = 1 is the exogenously given
21interest rate, ￿ is endogenously determined pro￿ts and ￿ is a constant related
to the extent of credit market imperfections due to enforcement problems.
Given that there is no need to invest more than k, an agent will be able to
become entrepreneur if and only if she has wealth a ￿ ae = k ￿ ￿￿:
As we have seen above, a critical variable is ￿; which summarizes how
the bargaining power is distributed between ￿rms and workers. De￿ne Ld
and Ls as the labor demand and supply respectively. Here, for simplicity, I
assume the following bargaining power rule:
Assumption 2
i) The agents on the short side of the market get all the surplus from the
relationship
ii)Conditional on application, the probability of getting a job in the public
sector is independent of wealth.
Given a ￿xed coe¢ cient technology, part i) simpli￿es the de￿nition of
equilibrium. Part ii) simpli￿es the analysis and is further discussed below.
The simple bargaining power rule in assumption 2 implies
Lemma 2
Fix G; then the equilibrium on the private labor market is unique and it
is characterized by ￿￿ such that ￿￿ = ppyp(G) ￿ ep ￿ ￿￿ if G ￿ G￿; or ￿+
22such that ppyp(G)￿ep￿￿+ = w otherwise. G￿ is such that n
n+1 = F(k￿￿￿￿)
A more e¢ cient bureaucracy increases the returns of being entrepre-
neurs. More projects can be ￿nanced and this increases the aggregate labor
demand. Fixing the level of public good at G; it is not possible to have
multiple equilibria. Once again, this lemma makes clear that multiple equi-
libria arise along the wb dimension and come directly from the (general)
equilibrium interaction between the public and the private sectors. I will
not provide a characterization of the equilibrium correspondence since the
extension remains very similar to the model analyzed above. The e⁄ects of
wealth inequalities are analyzed in the following proposition.
Proposition 5
Assume Gh > G￿ > Gl and take ￿rst order stochastic dominance as a
summary measure of inequalities in wealth distribution. Then
i) G￿ is increasing in wealth inequalities.
ii) An increase in inequalities can expand the multiple equilibria region.
A very unequal country may su⁄er from a lack of people having enough
wealth to become entrepreneurs, and will thus tend to have lower wages in
the private sector9. It will be more di¢ cult to screen applicants for pub-
9See e.g. Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Ghatak and Joung (2002)
23lic o¢ ce positions, and thus extreme inequalities will reinforce the perverse
mechanism explored above. If, for historical or cultural reasons, potential
entrepreneurs have on average higher public service motivation, or better op-
portunities to extracting rents from corruption in the public sector, the good
equilibrium could be destroyed. This perverse e⁄ect is e⁄ectively equivalent
to one in which richer classes are favored in the rationing process that shapes
entry in the bureaucracy, or in which there are strong social stigma against
entrepreneurship. Similar considerations are reported in Acemoglu (1995)
and Baumol (1990).
3.5 Motivated supervisors and endogenous rents
Assume that the bureaucracy is composed by a continuum of agencies, and
that each agency is composed by a large number of hierarchies. Civil servants
in the bureaucracy are divided into two tasks: agents and supervisors. I
assume for simplicity that each agent is matched with a supervisor. The
agent now controls the amount of resources g necessary to carry out the
production of the public good. The supervisor has to exert some e⁄ort,
which is non observable by third parties, in order to monitor the possible
misuse of resources in the lower level of the hierarchy. With an e⁄ort cost
of
q2
2￿ the supervisor ￿nd out if the agent is corrupt with probability q.
24While the corruption of an agent is veri￿able by a third party, I assume
here for simplicity that the outcome of the project can not be contracted
upon and that the supervisor has to be paid a ￿xed wage wm10. The agent
receives as before a ￿xed wage wb: Agents and supervisors are recruited from
the same pool of applicants: workers in the private sector. No educational
investment is required to become either supervisor or agent. With respect to
the previous section I assume for the sake of simplicity that a motivated civil
servant will enjoy the non monetary pay-o⁄, ￿ > g, if and only if the public
project succeeds. The project succeeds if the agent does not misuse public
resources or if, in the case of corruption, she is caught. A motivated agent
thus, will never be corrupt. Once the recruitment process is completed,
public servants are randomly assigned to an agency, they then observe the
type of their colleagues within the agency, and they form supervisor-agent
pairs. In equilibrium, these pairs maximize the surplus of workers within
the agency.
Lemma 3
10Indeed the supervisor could be given some incentives by conditioning her payment
on the report about corruption (which is veri￿able). Relaxing this assumption would
not change the main intuition of the analysis: all that is needed is that a motivated
supervisor has more incentives to monitor, and that a non motivated supervisor allows
some rents to the agent,which occurs when the Nash equilibrium is at a corner, i.e. if ￿ is
low enough. Moreover, the provision of incentives may become very costly if collusion is
allowed between the supervisor and the agent.
25Public servants surplus within each agency is maximized with assorta-
tive matching, i.e. motivated supervisors monitor motivated agents and non
motivated supervisors monitor non motivated agents.
Letting a non motivated supervisor monitor a motivated agent does not
produce corruption, it would be therefore optimal to allocate the motivated
supervisor to the monitoring of a non motivated agents. This negative sort-
ing allocation has two costs from the point of view of the supervisor - agent
pairs: assuming an interior solution for the Nash Equilibrium, the non mo-
tivated agents would randomize, choosing a probability of being corrupt
strictly lower than one, i.e. she will be losing a rent equal to g. The moti-
vated manager will, with strictly positive probability, lose the non monetary
pay-o⁄. Moreover she exert some monitoring e⁄ort, which is costly.
Proposition 6
When multiple equilibria exist, they are not necessarily Pareto Ranked.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. In the previous section, the
rents that one can acquire through corruption are exogenously given (both
g and q were exogenous). Clearly, by the very de￿nition of a pooling and a
separating equilibrium, nobody (not even corrupt agents) can be better o⁄in
the bad equilibrium than in the good one. Introducing this simple hierarchy
26allows the endogeneization of the probability of being caught q, determining
the rents that one can extract through corruption. In particular in a good
equilibrium, the bureaucracy will be composed by motivated agents that
will have high incentives to monitor. Therefore, a non motivated agent has
no incentives to work in an honest bureaucracy. In the pooling equilibrium
on the other hand, the bureaucracy is populated with supervisors that are
in the public sector just to earn a higher wage, and the pressure to punish
corruption is lower, thus a non motivated agent will be willing to enter the
public sector. The endogenously higher rents from corruption in the bad
equilibrium more than compensate the increase in the wage in the private
sector.
None of the modelling assumptions above is important to get the results:
what is really needed is that motivated supervisors will have more incentives
to monitor than non motivated supervisors, and that the presence of enough
non motivated supervisors attracts non motivated agents into the public
sector. Allowing for collusion11, could be a way of giving incentives even
to non motivated supervisors to monitor. If they can extract some of the
rents that an agent is getting out of corruption they will have incentives to
monitor. In equilibrium, this will in turn reduce the probability that the
11I.e. the possibility that, once a supervisor discovers the corruption of the agent, she
can ask bribes, extracting at least a part of the rents from corruption.
27agent itself is corrupt. On the other hand allowing for collusion spreads the
rents of corruption on multiple levels of the hierarchy making screening even
more di¢ cult. Again, a trade o⁄ between the provision of incentives on the
job and selection is obtained.
The recruitment processes at di⁄erent levels of the hierarchy are inher-
ently linked. It is in fact the presence of (enough) non motivated supervisors
that creates the rents attracting non motivated agents and causes corrup-
tion. This top-down mechanism, can be coupled by a bottom-up dynamic
in the case in which the bureaucratic procedures allow for collusion: in this
case, the presence of corrupt agents at lower levels creates rents for the su-
pervisors. This implies that reforms at speci￿c levels of the hierarchy can
have important e⁄ects on the whole bureaucracy. For instance, targeting
the recruitment of motivated supervisors can be a relatively cheap way of
improving the performance of the entire public sector. The fact that in the
model supervisors and agents are selected from the same pool, prevents us
from properly comparing wage compression in the public and in the private
sector. However, the fact that having motivated agents at the top of the
bureaucratic hierarchy is particularly important suggests that wages at the
top of the hierarchy should be lower (with respect to their counterparts in
the private sector) than at the bottom. This is consistent with strong evi-
28dence of wage compression in the public sectors in developed and developing
countries around the world.
More needs to be done on the analysis of the organizational forms of the
public sector in the di⁄erent equilibria of the model. In particular, it may
be interesting to analyze the trade o⁄ between fostering motivation by del-
egating authority and controlling corruption by retaining formal authority
at higher level of the public sector hierarchy. The analysis of the optimal
degree of delegation can then be thought as a way of endogeneizing ￿:
4 Discussion
The equilibrium correspondence in the model is determined with respect to
wb. Are the main results of the model robust to endogeneizing wb through
political economy mechanisms ? Multiple equilibria exist when the ratio
of the values of a career in the private and public sector is close to one.
It is likely that wages in the public sector will fall in this range even after
controlling for political economy considerations. Wages in the public sector
cannot be much higher than the highest possible wage in the private sector:
the wage bill for the public bureaucracy would be too high, and taxpayers
will not support it. Wages in the public bureaucracy may be very low instead
29generating endemic corruption, but this is unlikely to be a best response for
many political regimes. Moreover, as emphasized in Borland and Gregory
(1999) it is not clear which political economy mechanism determines public
sector wages. To focus on the precise economic mechanism described in the
paper, the model is silent about these aspects.
An important exogenous parameter is e g = g(1 ￿ q); the rent that it is
possible to acquire through corruption. While internal factors a⁄ecting e g
have been discussed in the previous section, general equilibrium factors will
likely have an ambiguous e⁄ect, and are reasonably omitted here12:
Lastly, our results importantly depend on the exogeneity of b: In a sense
the results are striking exactly if one neglects any kind of clienteralism that
raises b: a public sector recruiting workers for the pure sake of expanding
political support will not recruit motivated agents only. The model says that
having enough motivated agents in the economy is not enough to ensure a
good bureaucracy in equilibrium. While a benevolent government may have
an incentive to increase b in order to reduce the labor supply and increase
wages in the private sector, to facilitate screening, a clear trade o⁄ arises
with respect to wb, which will have to be lower, encouraging corruption and
12Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), for instance, relate the amount of money a bureaucrat
can control to the level of economic development. Although g could be increasing in w or
￿ (￿) (a richer private sector representing a bigger temptation), q is likely to increase also
with the level of development. The net e⁄ects on e g = g(1 ￿ q) are thus ambiguous.
30possibly reducing motivation13.
The main results of the model are ( i) the existence of multiple equilibria
even for small variations in the level of the public sector wage premium, ii)
the non monotonic relationship between public service compensation and
corruption, and iii) the role of wealth inequalities in exacerbating corruption
by reducing private sector wages) are broadly consistent with the existing
empirical evidence.
The existence of multiple equilibria suggests that culture, through its
e⁄ects on the expectations of individuals, may be an important determinant
of corruption. Tresiman (2000) ￿nds that history matters for corruption
more than the current economic and political situation. He reports that
￿ long lived aspects of countries￿cultural or institutional traditions a⁄ect the
level of perceived corruption more signi￿cantly than current state policies￿ .
Among the variables determining this ￿ tenacity of the past￿(exposure to)
democracy and colonial origins seems to be the most important.
Treisman (2000) is cautious in reporting the negative impact that public
sector wages have on corruption, because of endogeneity problems. Panizza
(2001), Evans and Rauch (2001) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997)
13Strong empirical evidence exists on the negative correlation between public sector
wages and employment for developing countries (see e.g. Panizza (2000) and Schiavo-
Campo et al. (1997)).
31do not ￿nd that higher wages are associated with lower corruption. While
an endogeneity problem exists (corrupt politicians will tend to set higher
public sector wages), this evidence is consistent with our results on the non
monotonic relationship between corruption and public sector wages.
The results in Panizza (2001) on Latin America, seem to suggest that
inequalities may indeed exacerbate corruption: in this notoriously unequal
region, a public sector wage premium is often observed associated with high
levels of corruption. Treisman (2000) ￿nds that, without controlling for eco-
nomic development, Latin America seems indeed to have a higher degree
of perceived corruption than what is predicted by other variables. Schiavo-
Campo et al.(1996) report evidence on the same lines. The recent successful
experiences of some East Asian countries in reducing corruption (e.g. Thai-
land), may have been facilitated by a relative equality in the distribution
of earnings, wealth, and opportunities. Lastly, in assessing the role of eco-
nomic development in determining corruption, one has to pay attention to
the reverse causality: corruption negatively a⁄ects development and growth.
The model identi￿es a precise mechanism (selection of public servant)
through which low economic development feeds back into poor government
quality and high corruption. Testing this mechanism through the estimation
of a structural model awaits future research.
325 Conclusions
This paper, after presenting a general mechanism producing multiple equi-
libria through the selection of heterogeneous individuals into di⁄erent oc-
cupations, presents a model applying this mechanism to the analysis of the
relationship between public sector motivation and development. The main
results are i) multiple equilibria can exist for a given level of compensation
in the public sector, ii) the relationship between public sector compensation
and corruption may be non monotonic and iii) inequalities in wealth dis-
tribution tend to reinforce the persistence of corruption. These results are
broadly supported by existing empirical evidence. The main policy implica-
tions are that it may not be su¢ cient to have a class of motivated agents
willing to work in the public sector to escape corruption and underdevelop-
ment. Moreover, cheap labor to hire in the bureaucracy, may indeed be a
further cause, and not only a consequence, of corruption. The model thus
identi￿es a precise channel through which the level of development is an
endogenous variable in the cross country regressions explaining the quality
of governance and corruption.
The model is simple, and it could be extended in many interesting direc-
tions. The analysis of the relationship between bureaucratic structures and
organizational form of ￿rms in developing countries seems to be particularly
33promising. Moreover a more complete theory must account for heterogeneity
in talent among workers. Introducing some form of heterogeneity in workers
tasks and wages would permit a detailed analysis of important institutional
arrangements, such as the extent of wage compression, the modes of re-
cruitment and the shape of career pro￿les in the two sectors. We leave the
exploration of the equilibrium interplay of incentives between the private
and public sector for future research.
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376 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We look for the contract that maximizes the utility of the agent. Denoting wh;i
and wl;i the wages paid in case of failure and success in sector i, the contract will
implement high e⁄ort ei if and only if piwh;i + (1 ￿ pi)wl;i ￿ eH;i ￿ 1
2wh;i +
1






The contract must also yield a pro￿t of at least ￿i ￿ 0 to the principals, i.e. it
must satisfy pi (yi(ej) ￿ wh;i) ￿ (1 ￿ pi)wl;i ￿ ￿i (ZP).
Claim
The ZP-constraint will be binding
Suppose not. Then it is possible to increase wk;i, for k = h;l; while still
satisfying the IC-constraint, increasing the utility of the agent, while still satisfying
the ZP-constraint jj
Given risk neutrality, there will typically be an in￿nite number of contracts
solving the problem, i.e. giving the same level of utility to the agent. A candidate
solution is given by the contract on the intersection of ZP and IC constraints,
provided it satis￿es the limited liability constraints. This contract is given by wh;i =
(1￿pi)
￿pi ei+piyi(nj)￿￿i and wl;i = ￿
pi
￿piei+piyi(nj)￿￿i; if ￿i ￿ pi(yi￿ ei
￿pi);
38otherwise it is not possible to satisfy LLC, ZP and IC; and the only implementable
contract entails a low e⁄ort. Any contract implementing high e⁄ort gives a utility
equal to Ui;h = piyi(nj) ￿ ￿i ￿ ei to the agent.
The contracts implementing the low level of e⁄ort do not need to satisfy the IC
constraint, and will satisfy the ZP constraint with equality. The contract giving
no incentives at all, i.e. wh;i = wl;i = w belongs to the this set of contracts and,
using the ZP; gives utility equal to Ui;l = 1
2yi(nj) ￿ ￿i:
Lastly, comparing Ui;l and Ui;h and rearranging terms we obtain Ui;h ￿ Ui;l
if and only if ￿piyi(nj) ￿ ei: This condition is weaker than ￿i ￿ pi(yi ￿ ei
￿pi) if
￿i ￿ 0 ￿:
Proof of Proposition 1





￿ e1 ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ type takes action eH succeeding
with probability p1;and 0￿type takes action eL succeeding with probability 1
2: If
p1y1 ￿ e1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿ > p2y2(p1) ￿ e2; ￿ ￿ type goes to sector 1, even when the
proportion of successes in sector 1 is p1: When p2y2(p1)￿e2 > 1
2y1￿￿1; 0￿type
goes to sector 2 if the proportion of successes in sector 1 is equal to p1: Separation
is thus an equilibrium.
If 1
2y1 ￿ ￿1 > p2y2(￿p1 + 1
2(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ e2; 0 ￿ type (and a fortiori ￿ ￿ type
) agents go to sector 1 with probability equal to one. The realized proportion of
39successes in sector 1 is equal to b p = ￿p1+ 1
2(1￿￿): Pooling is thus an equilibrium.
The third equilibrium is characterized as follows. Let ￿ be the proportion of
￿￿type in the population of mass one. De￿ne b ￿ as the solution of p2y2(b p)￿e2 =
1
2y1 ￿ ￿1 where b p = b ￿p1 + 1




;.y2(￿) being strictly increasing
and p1 > 1
2; if p2y2(1
2) ￿ e2 < 1
2y1 ￿ ￿1 < p2y2(p1) ￿ e2 this solution exists, is
unique and such that b ￿ 2 (0;1). Let 0 ￿ type randomize between sector 1 and 2
with respective probabilities e ￿ and 1 ￿ e ￿; with e ￿ such that 1 ￿ b ￿ =
(1￿￿)e ￿
￿+(1￿￿)e ￿:
Than ￿ ￿ types going to sector 1 with probability 1, 0 ￿ types going to sector
1 with probability e ￿ is (semi-)pooling equilibrium. To see why this equilibrium is
not stable, suppose that a small measure of 0 ￿ type randomize with probability
e ￿￿"; " arbitrarily small but positive. Then the realized proportion of 0￿type
in sector 1 will be 1 ￿ b ￿0 < 1 ￿ b ￿; implying p2y2(b p0) ￿ e2 > 1
2y1 ￿ ￿1 for
b p0 = b ￿0p1 + 1
2
￿
1 ￿ b ￿0￿
: But then all the other 0 ￿ type will ￿nd pro￿table to go
in sector 2 with probability 1, destroying the equilibrium.
Lastly note that none of the conditions above is mutually exclusive with the
others ￿:
Proof of Proposition 2
Existence of aGl-equilibrium if and only if Up(Gl) < V (￿￿g ￿ ￿;￿)
40Clearly this type of equilibrium only can occur if wb 2 [0;￿￿g ￿ ￿]: Suppose
instead Up(Gl) ￿ V (￿￿g ￿ ￿;￿); then, if wb 2 [0;Up(Gl) ￿ ￿) nobody wants to
work in the public sector, and assumption 1 is violated.
Existence of aGm-equilibrium if and only if Up(Gm) < V (￿￿g;0)
Clearly this type of equilibrium only can occur if wb 2 [￿￿g￿￿;￿￿g]: Suppose
instead that Up(Gm) > V (￿￿g;0): Then in the relevant interval separation must
occur, and partial corruption is not realized.
Existence of aGh-separating equilibrium if and only if Up(Gh) > V (￿￿g￿￿;0)
Suppose instead that Up(Gh) ￿ V (￿￿g ￿ ￿;0):Then for wb 2 [0;￿￿g ￿ ￿) a
pooling or a separating equilibrium may occur, but every agent will be corrupt. If
wb 2 [￿￿g ￿ ￿;￿￿g) then a pooling equilibrium must occur, with non motivated
agents being corrupt. If wb 2 [￿g;1); clearly a good equilibrium will be obtained
but it will not separate agents ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
Clearly multiple equilibria are possible only for wb 2 [￿￿g￿￿;￿￿g] (cfr. Propo-
sition 1): To see why multiple equilibria exist if Up(Gh) < ￿￿g+￿; note that when a





Call this set Ep: If Up(Gh) ￿ ￿￿g + ￿ only a pooling equilibrium exists for
wb 2 [V ￿1(Up(Gh);￿);1); where V ￿1(Up(Gh);￿) > ￿￿g: Call this set Ep:
41When Up(Gh) < ￿￿g + ￿ instead, Gh￿separating equilibria exist for wb 2
(maxfV ￿1(Up(Gh);￿);￿￿g￿￿g;V ￿1(Up(Gh);0)): Call this set Es: Then Ep\
Ep = ;; while Es\Ep = ME, ME de￿ned as wb 2 [maxf￿￿g￿￿; V ￿1(Up(Gm);0)
;V ￿1(Up(Gh);￿)g; minf￿￿g;V ￿1(Up(Gm);0)g] ￿
Proof of Proposition 4
Immediate from inspection of ￿gure 1 ￿:
Proof of Lemma 2
Claim
Labor demand is increasing in G.





) if ￿ >





otherwise. Ld is thus unambiguously
increasing in ￿: So that ￿ must be higher when entrepreneurs are on the long side
of the market. When entrepreneurs are on the long side of the market, they always
have the possibility of becoming workers, so that ￿ = Up(G): This implies that
￿￿ = ppyp(G) ￿ ep ￿ ￿￿: ￿￿ is thus increasing in G: When entrepreneurs are on
the short side it must be that they get all the surplus from the relationship, i.e.
Up(G) = w; this implies ppyp(G) ￿ ep ￿ ￿￿ = w; so that again ￿￿ is increasing
in G jj
42Given the claim, we have to ￿nd the value of G such that Ld = Ls: Using
assumption 1 part i) and assumption 2) part ii), we have that G￿ is de￿ned as the





) = F(k ￿￿￿￿(G))(1￿
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ b
￿)) when only motivated agents apply for the public sector, and to
n ￿ (1 ￿ F(k ￿ ￿￿￿(G)))(1 ￿ b) = F(k ￿ ￿￿￿(G))(1 ￿ b) when everybody
applies for the public sector.When V (￿) > ￿p > V (0) > w however Ld =






This case is however incompatible with Ld = Ls; because ￿p > w ￿.
Proof of Proposition 5
i) G￿ being the solution to F(k ￿ ￿￿￿(G)) = n
n+1; part i) comes from the
claim in the proof of Lemma 2. ii) By inspection of ￿gure 1 noting that an increase
in inequality can reduce Up(Gm) ￿:
Proof of Lemma 3
Let us denote q+
j (￿(￿)) the monitoring e⁄ort of a manager j 2 f0;￿g when she
is matched with an agent of type ￿(￿) 2 f0;￿g in a positive assortative matching
equilibrium; q￿
j (￿(￿)) will be the corresponding equilibrium monitoring e⁄ort in a
negative sorting equilibrium.
Claim
43The surplus generated by positive assortative matching is W+ = 2(ws +wb +
￿) + ￿g:
A motivated agent will never be corrupt, and thus the project will succeed with
probability one. The motivated manager, observing that the agent is motivated,
and therefore will never be corrupt, has no incentives to exert monitoring e⁄ort:
q+
￿ (￿) = 0: The surplus generated by a pair of motivated agents - supervisor is
ws + wb + 2￿: A non motivated supervisor will never have incentives to monitor:
q+
0 (0) = 0: Knowing this, a non motivated agent will be corrupt with probability
one. A non motivated pair thus generates a surplus ws + wb + ￿g: Summing the
surplus of the two pairs gives us W+ = 2(ws + wb + ￿) + ￿g jj
Claim








A motivated agent again will never be corrupt, thus the project is realized
successfully with probability one. The non motivated supervisor does not exert any
e⁄ort, and thus q￿
0 (￿) = 0: The pair motivated agent - non motivated supervisor
generates a surplus of ws + wb + ￿: The motivated supervisor has incentives to
monitor, and, given the probability c that the non motivated agent is corrupt,
she will optimally set q￿
￿ (0) = ￿c￿: If ￿￿ >
g
g+wb the equilibrium will be in
44mixed strategy. It will thus be given by q￿
￿ (0) =
g





non motivated agent is randomizing, she is thus indi⁄erent between being corrupt







wb+g): The total surplus generated by negative sorting will













wb+￿g) > 0 ￿:
Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that while applying to the public sector a worker does not know if she
will be supervisor or agent. Conditional of being accepted in the public sector, the
two events are realized with the same probability. The proof works with the same
logic if the assigned task in the public sector is known to the worker before the
application is done.
Claim








Because of the assortative matching result supervisors never monitor: motivated
supervisors are matched with motivated agents, therefore they do not need to mon-
itor. Non-motivated supervisors have no incentives to monitor. In the pooling equi-
libria thus, non motivated agents are never caught and earn wb + ￿g: Being 1
2 the









In a separating equilibrium non motivated agents would earn in the public
sector V (wb;0) = 1
2wb + 1
2ws.
Consider a deviation by a small mass of measure " of non motivated agents. The
probability that they will be agents and matched with a non motivated supervisor
is arbitrarily close to zero. V (wb;0) = 1
2wb + 1
2wsjj







2ws > Up(Gm), while the separating one is given by 1
2wb +
1
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Complete
corruption
no corruption
47